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Ill-Gotten Gains: The Case for
International Corporate Criminal
Liability
Jordan Sundell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although many corporations act responsibly, economically
fragile countries and war zones have proved fertile ground for a
number of multinational corporations to commit a variety of
serious international crimes. In such cases the offending
corporation all too often goes under-punished or escapes
punishment altogether. Take for example Nigeria. In 1995 the
Nigerian government, in response to pressure from Royal
Dutch Shell to repress environmental protestors, executed nine
indigenous tribal leaders, including the well-known writer and
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, 1 on suspect murder
charges.2 Royal Dutch Shell eventually settled the claim in U.S.
federal court for $15.5 million, less than two-tenths of one
percent of the profits the company made from the region in the
more than thirty years it operated there.3 Across the world, on
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006,
University of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank his wife for her love
and support, Professors Weissbrodt and Ní Aoláin for their comments, and all
of the members of the Minnesota Journal of International Law for their
contributions.
1. See Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing,
GUARDIAN, June 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria
-usa. For his work organizing indigenous peoples and minorities into a
peaceful movement, Ken Saro-Wiwa was awarded the Goldman
Environmental Prize as well as the Right Livelihood Award. See Recipients by
Year, THE GOLDMAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRIZE, http://www.goldmanprize.org/re
cipients/year (last visited Sept. 4, 2010); List of Right Livelihood Award
Laureates, THE RIGHT LIVELIHOOD AWARD, http://www.rightlivelihood.org/lau
reates.html?&no_cache=1 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
2. See Pilkington, supra note 1.
3. See JOHN MADELEY, BIG BUSINESS, POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACT OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD’S POOR, 123 (1999) (More
than $30 billion in oil was removed from Ogoniland between 1960 and 1994);
Ken SaroWiwa, THE RIGHT LIVELIHOOD AWARD, http://www.rightlivelihood.org/saro-wi
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the war-ridden streets of Iraq in September 2007, a
Blackwater 4 convoy fired on a group of civilians in Nisour
Square, leaving seventeen dead.5 A trial failed to convict the
guards as a result of evidentiary and immunity complications.6
Nor is corporate malfeasance a new phenomenon. In the
1950s the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation with a
virtual monopoly in Guatemala, overthrew a democratically
elected government there with the help of the CIA.7 Likewise,
some of the earliest multinational corporations such as the
British and Dutch East India Companies meddled with local
governments and exploited human and natural resources.8
Herein resides the issue. Until recently, international
criminal law has largely ignored the actions of corporations. At
the same time, corporations have grown into organizations of
herculean proportions with far flung subsidiaries and contacts
that span the globe. In conjunction with that expansion, certain
corporations have committed grave abuses in the developing
world that would be impermissible in the developed world. Nor
does this trend seem likely to recede absent changes in the
wa.html (Royal Dutch Shell enjoyed a 30% share of the oil profits made off the
region). See also Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Settlement
Reached in Human Rights Cases Against Royal Dutch/Shell (June 8, 2009)
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/settlement-reached-human-right
s-cases-against-royal-dutch/shell (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (While the
settlement only resolved the claims of the individual plaintiffs, a portion of the
settlement will be dedicated to initiatives to support the Ogoni people).
4. Blackwater Worldwide, now called Xe Services, is a private security
force that was used heavily by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan
before the massacre. See Blackwater Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/blackwater_usa/index.
html.
5. See James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater are Collapsing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/
world/21contractors.html?_r=2&hp.
6. See id. at A2 (explaining that there is uncertainty whether
Blackwater, under a contract from the Department of State, is subject to the
same criminal liability as Department of Defense contractors are and that
following the shootings, government investigators gave the Blackwater
personnel immunity in exchange for information).
7. See generally STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER
FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 153, 159
(1982) (chronicling the role of United Fruit Company in the overthrow of the
Guatemalan government).
8. See CLIVE DAY, A HISTORY OF COMMERCE 200 (1907). See, e.g., Teemu
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1677
(2000) (calling the British East India Company "one of the most notorious
corporations of all time.").
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status quo.
Given multinational corporations’ reach and ability to act
irresponsibly in the developing world more or less with
impunity, this Note proposes that the international community
should either extend the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to legal persons or adopt a specialized
international tribunal empowered to try corporations for their
role in egregious human rights abuse. Part I of this Note will
review the history of corporate responsibility in international
law, discuss the main approaches to handling corporate
criminality, and address the relative strengths and weaknesses
of domestic courts and international tribunals in the context of
corporate criminal liability. Part II will respond to the main
critiques of corporate criminal liability, evaluate the efficacy of
domestic legal systems’ reactions to corporate criminality, and
suggest that domestic courts utilizing civil liability should
adjudicate lesser offenses while international courts applying
criminal sanctions should, subject to complementarity, resolve
serious offenses.9 Finally, Part III concludes with suggestions
on how to amend the ICC or fashion a special international
tribunal to increase the international accountability of
corporations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A BRIEF TOUR OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II LANDSCAPE
Prior to World War II (WWII), international law,
constrained states rather than individuals. 10 The Nuremburg
trials transformed this proposition by finding individuals
accountable for violating human rights. 11 Subsequent trials,
9. The line demarking lesser offenses from serious offenses remains open
to debate. A potential resolution may lie in utilizing the ICC’s rubric of
limiting serious offenses to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. An additional category of gross environmental violations might also
be important to curbing the worst multinational actors.
10. See ALICE BULLARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 39, 51 (2008). Compare
id. (“World War II is recognized as the critical moment in global consciousness
and consensus regarding the human cost of warfare. The conclusion of the war
stimulated the growth of human rights law, and the emergence of a global
human rights regime.”) with Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and
International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 135 (2005) (writing that “the Nuremberg
trial helped extend international law beyond its traditional application to
states and into the realm of human rights.”).
11. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of
Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War
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referred to generally as the “industrialist cases,” found that
German citizens, primarily wealthy industrialists, were guilty
of committing war crimes.12 One of these war crimes, termed
“aggressive war,” is based on the theory that these individuals
had encouraged Germany to make war in order to secure
economic gain through military investments in industry.13 All
those charged with this specific war crime were later acquitted
on the belief that their actions were not covered by the
Nuremberg Charter and that “active participation in the
armament of Germany did not suffice to render an individual
guilty of aggressive war.” 14 Other businessmen were found
guilty and were sentenced with prison—and death by hanging
in some cases—for engaging in property crimes, slave labor,
and as accessories to war crimes. 15 Indeed, the tribunals
explicitly rejected the argument that private individuals could
not be charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity.16
In addition to directly prosecuting corporate leaders for crimes
committed in an individual capacity, the Nuremburg trials also
opened up another avenue for charging corporations with
human rights violations: complicit liability such as aiding and
abetting. 17 Since the Nuremburg trials, the Genocide
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F.L. REV. 167, 170 (2005).
12. See Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist
Prosecutions and Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 653 (2006).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 657–58. See also United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in
6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1192 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93,
101 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (convicting Bruno Tesch of distributing the
poison gas, Zyklon B, to concentration camps knowing it would be used to kill
civilians); United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW 10, at 681, 852, 1186 (1952) (convicting Frederick Flick and
other members of a mining conglomerate of contributing money to the Nazi
government with full knowledge of their crimes); United States v. Krauch (The
I.G. Farben Case), in 7-8 id. at 309 (1942) (convicting thirteen executives of
I.G. Farben, a chemical corporation, of unlawful deportation and the use of
slave labor); United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), in 9 id. at 467, 667
(convicting eleven defendants, executives of Krupp Industrial, of exploitation
and slave labor offenses).
16. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 286; see also The I.G. Farben Case, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1136 (1942) (“It can no longer be questioned that the
criminal sanctions of international law are applicable to private individuals.”).
17. Richard Herz, Text of Remarks: Corporate Alien Tort Liability and the
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Convention, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the
ICC have all recognized that along with individuals, non-state
actors such as corporations could be held accountable for
violations of international law.18
B. FORMS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
OFFENSES
Efforts to remedy corporate wrongdoing have largely
followed three approaches: civil liability imposed by domestic
courts, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions,
and soft law.
i. Civil Liability
The most prominent codification of civil liability for
international offenses is the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).
Starting with the landmark case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in
1980, human rights lawyers began to use the ATCA to bring a
series of lawsuits against foreign human rights violators,
including corporations, in U.S. federal courts.19 Liability under
the ATCA attaches when a violation of either “the law of
nations” or “a treaty of the United States” occurs. 20 The
Supreme Court has interpreted these terms to extend only to
offenses that would violate 1789-era international law such as
piracy, infringement of ambassadorial rights, and violation of
safe conduct, 21 as well as violations of modern international
norms of comparable definiteness and agreement among

Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 76, 77 (2006–2007). For example, in
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, an action brought under the U.S. Alien Tort
Statute whereby non-U.S citizens can bring claims against one another for
violations of the law of nations, the court expressly relied on the Nuremburg
trials in finding that corporations could be found liable for their complicity in
human rights violations. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117,
134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
18. See Gwynne Skinner, Nuremburg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremburg
Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien
Tort Statute, 71 Alb. L. Rev. 321, 340–41 (2008)
19. In Filartiga, two Paraguayan citizens employed a then-seldom-used
1789 statute, the ATCA, to sue a Paraguayan government official for an act of
torture that took place in Paraguay. The litigation resulted in an award of
$10.3 million in damages. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
21. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15 (2004).

SUNDELL - Final

2011]

5/6/2011 12:12 PM

THE CASE FOR INT’L CORPORATE LIABILITY

653

civilized nations as the 1789-era claims.22 Assuming a plaintiff
can allege a valid claim, the ATCA covers general corporate
activity23 and also permits courts to find a parent corporation
liable for the actions of its subsidiaries under certain
circumstances.24
Besides the vagueness of what torts come within the Act’s
ambit, commentators have highlighted three other drawbacks
to the ATCA for plaintiffs. First, the majority of jurisdictions
require a showing that the corporation either acted with state
aid or in concert with a state actor.25 This prong heightens the
investigatory demands on plaintiffs and suggests that claims
lacking a state component may not be justiciable under the
ATCA. Second, U.S. courts tend not to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants save when “sufficient connections”
exist between the court and the defendant. 26 In the case of
foreign state defendants, demonstrating sufficient connections
can be a taxing bar for plaintiffs. 27 Third, even if a litigant
surmounts the first two hurdles, forum non conveniens often
prevents the claim. 28 In concert, these three features pose
22. Id. at 732.
23. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(concluding that international law may hold private actors like Unocal Corp.
liable for major violations of international law); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d
232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that non-state actors can violate the law of
nations including war crimes and other international criminal offenses).
24. See In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 271
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In some instances, the corporate relationship between a
parent and its subsidiary [is] sufficiently close as to justify piercing the
corporate veil and holding one corporation legally accountable for the actions
of the other.” (alternation in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Thomson-CSF, S.A v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.
1995))).
25. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239–40, 245; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2000). But Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (writing
that for a handful of private acts, such as piracy and slave trading, the ATCA
permitted individual liability absent state aid).
26. See Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law: Corporate
Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2025, 2039–40 (2000–2001) [hereinafter Corporate Liability]; Wiwa, 226 F.3d
88 (noting the various standards to determine whether plaintiffs and
defendants have sufficient contacts in a state to make them subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction definition).
27. See generally Corporate Liability at 2040. But see Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88
(stating the Second Circuit’s reversal of the judgment dismissing claims based
on the absence of personal jurisdiction over two foreign corporations).
28. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(noting a dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against a U.S firm on grounds that the
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considerable obstacles to plaintiffs seeking U.S court
jurisdiction, particularly low-income citizens of developing
nations.
ii. United Nations Security Council
The United Nations (UN) Charter charges the UNSC with
maintaining international order and security.29 Where a threat
to peace exists, the UNSC has the authority to adopt nonmilitary measures such as “complete or partial interruption of
economic relations . . . .” 30 These sanctions can target the
business activities of States, individuals, and groups of
individuals or legal persons.31 For example, in 1993 the UNSC
placed an embargo on arms and oil in Angola to hinder an
Angolan military group.32 Similarly, in 2000 it banned diamond
exports in Sierra Leone.33
However, UN sanctions suffer from a significant
shortcoming: indirectness. 34 The UN cannot prosecute
individuals, groups, or entities that violate a UN-imposed
embargo. 35 As such, member states, rather than the UNSC,
have the onus of ensuring legal violations do not go
unpunished.36 Even more important, the UNSC did not act in
Angola or Sierra Leone to suppress corporate wrongdoing, but
rather to pressure specific political regimes. 37 Given the
UNSC’s silence in the face of the Rwandan genocide, 38 the
case should be adjudicated in Ecuador and Peru as more appropriate forums).
29. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
30. Id. art. 41.
31. Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International
and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 210–11 (2010)
(discussing the use of economic sanctions on states, individuals and groups of
individuals or legal persons).
32. S.C. Res. 864, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993).
33. Bismuth, supra note 31, at 210–11 (noting the use of sanctions in the
diamond conflict in Sierra Leone).
34. Id. at 211 (discussing how the UN is unable to directly prosecute
individuals, groups and persons violating its embargoes).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See S.C. Res. 1306, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000)
(noting that the purpose of the sanctions was to pressure the government of
Sierra Leone to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime in order to
aid in establishing stability in the region).
38. See Michael N. Barnett, The UN Security Council, Indifference, and
Genocide in Rwanda, 12 Cultural Anthropology 551, 561 (1997) (discussing
the UNSC’s inaction in the face of suffering in Rwanda).
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Burmese pipeline tragedy, 39 and a variety of other appalling
behaviors, 40 relying on the UNSC may prove a recipe for
impunity.
iii. Soft Law
A variety of organizations such as the UN and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) have taken a different approach to corporate
criminality. Rather than sanctioning activities after the fact,
these organizations have fashioned a number of soft laws. 41
Though not technically binding or backed by formal
accountability mechanisms, 42 the international standards
championed by these soft laws aim to cultivate a body of norms
that will shape future corporate behavior. 43 In 2003, for
example, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights adopted an initiative entitled
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights.” 44 The initiative reaffirmed and fleshed out
39. In Burma, civilians near a pipeline building project “have [allegedly]
been subjected to forced labour, rape and even murder by army units working
for the oil companies to protect the pipelines.” Shirin Wheeler, EU probes
Burma pipeline abuses, BBC, Oct. 12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1
596181.stm. The United States has imposed sanctions, id., but the UNSC has
failed to act. Crackdown in Burma: Targeted Sanctions Needed, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/11/crack
down-burma-targeted-sanctions-needed.
40. See Daniel Nasaw, China and Russia Veto Zimbabwe Sanctions,
GUARDIAN, July 11, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/united
nations.zimbabwe (discussing China and Russia’s blocking of sanctions
against Zimbabwe).
41. For the purposes of this Note, “soft law” means non-binding quasilegal agreements such as UN resolutions and codes of conducts furnished by
relevant international non-governmental organizations. For a fuller discussion
of soft law see Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94
MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010). For more on soft law initiatives geared towards
corporations see John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The
Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819–20 (2007).
42. Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative
Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses,
26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 43, 63–66 (2005–2006) (discussing the non-binding
nature of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises).
43. Bismuth, supra note 31, at 211–12 (discussing the OECD’s attempt at
using soft law to shape corporate behavior).
44. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
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corporations’ responsibility to respect international commercial
law, particularly in relation to the rights of workers and the
security of people.45
iv. A New Contender: Corporate Criminal Liability
a. The International Criminal Court
Another potential conduit for holding corporations liable is
the ICC. However, in its current form the ICC does not have
the authority to do so. Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the
ICC has jurisdiction over natural, but not legal persons 46
committing the “most serious [international] crimes.”47 To date,
this mandate encompasses genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.48
In order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction one of four
preconditions must be met: (1) the person accused of
committing a crime is a national of a state party to the Rome
Statute,49 (2) the alleged crime was committed in the territory
of a state party to the Rome Statute,50 (3) the UNSC refers the
case to the ICC,51 or (4) either the state where the accused is a
national or the state where the crime was committed accepts
the jurisdiction of the court.52 To exercise that jurisdiction the
case must be referred to the Prosecutor by either a state party
or the UNSC.53 Alternatively, the Prosecutor may also decide to
unilaterally initiate an investigation, but must go before a pretrial chamber to get further authorization if his initial findings
indicate a reasonable basis for continuing the investigation.54
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). For more information on soft
laws impact on international behavior see David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901
(2003).
45. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 44, at 911–12 (discussing the
responsibilities corporations have over activities within their influence).
46. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]
(referencing natural persons, but not legal persons).
47. Id. art. 5(1).
48. Id. art. 5(1)(a–d).
49. Id. art. 12(2)(b).
50. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
51. Id. art. 13(b).
52. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 12(3).
53. Id. art. 13.
54. Id. art. 15.
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In addition to limited territorial jurisdiction, ICC
jurisdiction has another critical limitation known as
complementarity, which recognizes the right of states to have
the first opportunity to prosecute their own nationals.55 Under
the principle of complementarity, the ICC may act only if a
state will not or cannot genuinely investigate or prosecute the
crime at issue.56 Furthermore, the ICC may only act if a crime
is of sufficient gravity and if the individual has not already
been tried for the same conduct in another court.57
b. Domestic Approaches
While the ICC does not hold corporations criminally liable,
a growing number of countries employ various forms of
corporate criminal liability in their domestic law, such as The
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and France. 58
Some countries, for instance France, generally restrict liability
to high ranking officials and their agents. 59 Others, like the
United States, permit holding corporations criminally liable for
the actions of each employee as well as the cumulative acts of
its employees. 60 For example, a US federal prosecutor can
charge a corporation with a crime if any employee, not just a
high-ranking employee,61 commits an offense.62 Furthermore, if
multiple individuals within the corporation possess the
elements of criminal wrongdoing, a court may attribute their
aggregate knowledge to the corporation.63 Under the aggregate
knowledge test, even if a court could not find any single
employee liable, it could find the corporation liable.
Importantly, the US criminal liability regime also allows a
55. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression: Is There an
Answer to the International Criminal Court’s Dilemma?, 65 A.F.L. REV. 229,
246 (2010).
56. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 17(a–b).
57. Id. art. 17(1)(c–d).
58. Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western
Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 110–15 (2004).
59. Id. at 117.
60. Being able to impute the cumulative acts of the corporation’s
employees is particularly important in cases where no one employee has done
enough to incur liability.
61. United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660
(2d Cir. 1989).
62. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 475–76 (3rd Cir. 1998).
63. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st.
Cir. 1987).
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court to extend liability from the immediate corporation to
controlling parent corporations 64 or de facto successor
corporations if necessary.65
In general, a corporation may be criminally responsible
under US corporate criminal liability for the illegal acts of its
employees provided that such acts are: (1) connected to and
done within the course of employment, (2) for the benefit of the
corporation, and (3) with the authorization or acquiescence of
the corporation. 66 In assessing a corporation’s culpability, a
judge must consider four aggravating factors and two
mitigating factors. The aggravating factors include (1) the
involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by “high level”
or “substantial authority” personnel, (2) a recent history of
similar misconduct on the organization’s part, (3) a violation of
a judicial order or condition of probation, and (4) whether the
corporation tried to obstruct justice. 67 Mitigating factors
include (1) the presence of “an effective program to prevent and
detect violations of law” by corporate agents and (2) the extent
of the corporation’s cooperation with law enforcement
officials.68
At sentencing, a judge has a number of sanctions at his or
her disposal. The most common penalty is fines. 69 However,
judges can also deprive the corporation of the gains it received
as a result of its illegal activities,70 suspend the corporation’s
operations for a period of time, dissolve the corporation
altogether (i.e., a corporate death sentence), or order the
corporation to pay for negative publicity (e.g., tobacco
companies in the United States have to pay for anti-smoking
advertisements).71 Finally, a judge may try to rehabilitate the
corporation.72 As a matter of practice, the main sanctions tend
64. Massachusetts v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 91–92 (Mass.
1971).
65. United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F. Supp 569, 571–72
(W.D.Pa. 1989).
66. 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4942 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009)..
67. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 784 (1992).
68. Id.
69. ANCA IULIA POP, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONSCOMPARATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE
39
(2006)
available
at
http://www.law.msu.edu/king/2006/2006_Pop.pdf.
70. Id. at 40.
71. Id. at 4, 39.
72. Traditionally, this occurs through one of two forms: by placing the
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to be fines, restitution, remedial orders, community service,
and probation.73
C. BODIES OF JUSTICE: PROS AND CONS OF DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Assuming the international community prefers a legal
solution over an ad hoc process involving the UNSC, two likely
approaches exist for handling major human rights abuses:
domestic proceedings (whether civil or administrative) and
international tribunals. 74 Which forum handles a corporate
abuse case can have profound implications for the corporation,
the victims, and the local government.
i. Domestic Trials
Prosecuting corporate offenders in domestic courts has
three primary benefits. First, domestic trials can burnish the
political legitimacy of a regime, particularly a new regime, at
the local, national, and international level. 75 For developing
nations especially, prosecuting violations simultaneously
demonstrates the regime’s capacity and respect for human
rights.76 Greater capacity and respect for the rule of law can
favorably demark a new government from an old regime. 77
Second, domestic prosecution builds up the local legal system
by establishing local courts and police forces as fair and
corporation on probation or by ordering it to reorganize. Id. at 38–39.
73. Id. at 38–44.
74. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving
Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996)
(arguing that the international community has a moral obligation to seek
justice following human rights abuses, whether by international or domestic
mechanisms); Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights
Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591 (1998) (highlighting the importance of victim
redress for human rights violations and deploring the prevalence of impunity
for violators); Neil J. Kritz, Coming To Terms with Atrocities: A Review of
Accountability Mechanisms For Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1996) (explaining that the appropriate response to
human rights abuses will depend on the specific circumstances and should
take into account the needs of the victims).
75. Kritz, supra note 74, at 132.
76. See id. at 132–33 (noting that trials demonstrate the new regimes
determination to hold individuals accountable as well as the capacity to
actually do so through a rebuilt legal system).
77. See id. (noting that trials of serious claims like war crimes garner
considerable international attention and show the new government’s resolve
for holding perpetrators accountable).
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effective.78 Last, domestic prosecutions provide catharsis. That
is, the prosecution acknowledges the wrongs of the past while
promising hope for a better future, free of human rights
violations.79
At the same time, domestic trials, especially in the
developing world, have several weaknesses. Procedural
irregularities, political pressure, and lingering societal strife
can color domestic adjudications.80 This coloring can cut both
ways. Inadequate procedural safeguards such as a lack of
transparency provide an environment conducive to
corruption. 81 That kind of environment in turn provides
corporations with numerous opportunities to influence the
proceedings. On the other hand, local political sentiment may
permit states to victimize corporations through unfair,
politicized laws.82 Along with procedural and political problems,
domestic courts also face major jurisdictional restraints. 83 In
most cases, domestic courts can only impose jurisdiction when
the person or the crime is linked to the state the court resides
in.84
ii. International Tribunals
Besides domestic proceedings, the other major method
available for resolving international corporate human rights
abuse is international tribunals. The international nature of
these tribunals is their greatest advantage. The global backing
inherent in an international forum “convey[s] a clear message
that the international community will not tolerate such
78. See id. at 133 (noting that such trials “provide an important focus for
rebuilding the domestic judiciary and criminal justice system” and establish
“local courts as a credible forum for the redress of grievances in a nonviolent
manner.”).
79. Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373,
375 (2006).
80. See Kritz, supra note 74, at 136–39 (citing Bosnia as illustrative of the
difficulties incumbent in politically and ethnically divided societies).
81. See Sterio, supra note 79, at 376 (noting that in this type of
environment judges may be biased due to corruption).
82. For example, in August 1960, Cuba issued an executive resolution
expropriating all property and enterprises wholly or principally owned by
American nationals. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 403
(1964). More recently, Bolivia and Venezuela have nationalized much of their
oil industries, expropriating the property of companies like ConocoPhillips,
Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP, and Total. Venezuela Takes Over Refineries, BBC
NEWS (May 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6610333.stm.
83. Sterio, supra note 79, at 376.
84. Id.
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atrocities . . . .” 85 In addition to signaling the international
community’s resolve, application of international law
eliminates the potentially unfair use of politically-driven
domestic laws while advancing the legitimacy of international
human rights standards. Finally, an international body can
often avoid procedural issues relating to jurisdiction and access
to evidence that frequently hinder domestic courts.86 Likewise,
a tribunal’s global reputation might secure cooperation from
third parties and theoretically “neutral” governments that a
domestic tribunal would not receive.87
For all of their benefits, international judicial bodies have
some serious drawbacks. First, international judges and
prosecutors may ignore, or, at least, undervalue a country’s
political situation.88 For example, during its first two years of
operation in Rwanda the ICTR at times barred its staff from
any contact with Rwandan authorities, even those who
possessed useful information; did not make contact with
victim’s groups, which could have provided a wealth of evidence
and information; and generally kept itself at arm’s length from
the country.89 That distance left the impression that Rwanda’s
wounds were “completely irrelevant to tribunal officials.” 90
Second, international prosecutions may only have a muted
impact within the country of the human rights violation.91 The
proceedings generally take place in a foreign tongue in a
courtroom far from both the place of the crime and the people
most directly affected by the prosecution.92 This often causes
local populations to see the tribunal decisions as the product of
“occidental bias and victor’s justice” rather than as a fair and

85. Kritz, supra note 74, at 129.
86. See id. at 129–30 (noting that personal jurisdiction and access to
evidence issues are often more easily solved by an international court whose
statute was specifically designed to deal with these kinds of situations).
87. See id. For example, often potential defendants are not accessible or
have long since vacated the territory where the atrocities were committed;
thus, “an international tribunal stands a greater chance than local courts of
obtaining their physical custody and extradition.” Id. at 129.
88. See id. at 145–46 (highlighting the disconnect between the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the country of Rwanda
itself).
89. Id. at 146.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 132–33.
92. Id. at 130–31 (explaining the reasons why the ICTY and ICTR did not
sit within Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively).
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impartial determination. 93 Third, a number of hybrid
international fora like the ICTY and ICTR do not possess
automatic enforcement mechanisms. 94 As such, these bodies
rely on state cooperation to give effect to their judgments.95
In summary, three main potential mechanisms exist for
combating international corporate human rights abuse: the
UNSC and other state-to-state relations, domestic courts, and
international tribunals. For the latter two options, two types of
liability exist: criminal and civil. As discussed above, each of
these approaches has pros and cons. In light of these strengths
and weaknesses, this Note turns to a comparison of the options
and makes some recommendations.
II. ANALYSIS
A. COMPARING THE CONTENDERS
i. UN Security Council and Soft Law are (Small) Parts of the
Solution
Despite the inconsistent enforcement of UNSC resolutions,
and the non-binding nature of soft laws, the two mechanisms
nevertheless play a normative role in altering future behavior.
According to Harold Hongju Koh, international human rights
law develops through a process in which norms and rules are
generated, internalized, and, ultimately, adopted as the new
rules governing international conduct.96 Following this line of
reasoning, UNSC resolutions and soft laws, combined with
efforts to reduce the immediate problem, provide normgenerating guidance for future actors. That is, they provide
normative guidance about how actors ought to behave. Over
time, these normative appeals seep into an international actor’s
decisions and eventually guide that actor’s behavior, whether
consciously or not.
However, norm generation does little in the present to hold
corporations responsible or to provide victims a sense of justice.
Take for example Burma. In order to clear land designated for
93. Sterio, supra note 79, at 378.
94. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice:
External Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. (FALL) 21, 23 (2002).
95. Id.
96. Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1407 (1998).
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a pipeline, Burmese agents used rape, torture, and murder to
relocate people that refused to leave their homes.97 However,
the country’s leadership has thus far escaped formal
approbation from the UNSC. 98 Indeed, China has taken a
leading role in protecting Burma from repercussions. 99
Zimbabwe, too, has sidestepped sanctions despite its atrocious
human rights record.100 Something beyond waiting for norms to
slowly coalesce should be done.
ii. Stacking Them Up: Civil Liability vs. Criminal Liability
Going beyond generating norms, civil liability offers
victims concrete opportunities to redress the harm visited upon
them by corporations violating human rights. However,
although civil liability has some significant advantages, it also
suffers from serious shortcomings that do not arise with
criminal liability. These shortcomings suggest an opportunity
for criminal liability to become an important arrow in the
international system’s quiver to combat corporate malfeasance.
Prime among civil liability’s advantages is its ubiquity.
Almost every jurisdiction (if not all) have laws imposing civil
liability.101 As such, corporations theoretically face the risk of
litigation throughout the globe. Similarly, civil liability covers
more actors than criminal liability. That is, civil liability
applies to both natural and legal persons, while criminal law
tends to focus on natural persons and often limits the liability
of legal persons.102 Likewise, civil liability generally requires a
lower burden of proof than criminal liability.103 For example, in
the United States criminal liability requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt104 whereas civil liability only necessitates a
97. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed and district court
opinion vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
98. Edith M. Lederer, China, Russia Veto Myanmar Resolution, WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2
007/01/13/AR2007011300296.html.
99. Colum Lynch, U.S. Push for Burmese War Crimes Probe Hits Chinese
Wall, FOREIGN POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 24, 2010, 12:34 PM), http://turtlebay.foreignp
olicy.com/posts/2010/10/24/us_push_for_burmese_war_crimes_probe_hits_chin
ese_wall.
100. Nasaw, supra note 40.
101. 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008), available at http://icj.org/IMG/Volume_3.pdf.
102. Id. at 4–6.
103. Id.
104. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring the government to prove
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preponderance of the evidence. 105 That lower burden
theoretically makes it easier for plaintiffs to successfully
prosecute their claim. Finally, civil liability provides an
independent source of recompense that victims can pursue
regardless of how the victim’s government handles the
situation. 106 Conversely, criminal proceedings depend on
government action since the prosecutor typically has the last
word on whether a prosecution will go forward.
Benefits aside, civil liability possesses some serious flaws.
First, civil liability tends to be time restricted. Since victims of
human rights violations often take a long time to organize and
act against a violator, time is an integral component of holding
human rights violators responsible. 107 Second, civil liability
faces jurisdictional restraints. For instance, it can be difficult if
not impossible to sue a corporation for an offense in State Y if
the crime happened in State X against a person from State
X. 108 At first glance it may seem right that if a corporation
harms a citizen of one state in that citizen’s state, civil suits
should go forward in that state. However, this can raise
problems, particularly in certain developing countries and
quasi-states where legal mechanisms are non-existent,
inadequate, or corrupt. Third, the elements of civil liability,
principally negligence, intentionality, and causation, may not
translate well to grave international crimes. 109 Fourth, civil
liability makes for an unpredictable process due to the
difficulty of calculating which set of laws applies in all but the
most straightforward cases. Take for instance a case in which a
crime occurred in State W against a person from State X by a
citizen of State Z who was acting as an agent of a corporation
based in State Y. Some states would apply the law of the
country where the harm occurred while other states would use
the law of the corporation’s home country or the victim’s home
country for various other plausible reasons.110 This uncertainty
every essential element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt); see,
e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
105. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Daigle, 444 A.2d 519, 520 (N.H. 1982) (“In a civil
action the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff to establish its case by a
preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (E.
Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
106. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 101, at 4–6.
107. See id. at 44–45.
108. See id. at 49–51.
109. Id. at 13, 21.
110. Id. at 51–53; see also Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for
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raises litigation costs by guaranteeing a legal battle over which
state’s law to apply. Fifth, civil liability fails to adequately
capture the gravity of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. No matter how high the monetary fine, to label a
crime “non-criminal” lessens the stigma and seriousness of the
crime.111 Indeed, a financial judgment may suggest little more
than that a corporation did something questionable and elected
to pay to make the problem go away. Finally, the civil system is
less well equipped than criminal systems to handle major
international crimes perpetrated by corporations because of
their ponderous mechanisms for investigation and evidence
collection.112
An international criminal law approach, in contrast, would
remedy the gaps in civil liability. War crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide do not have a statute of limitations.113
An international approach would likely surmount at least some
of the jurisdiction issues that any lone domestic legal system
would face. A criminal law approach applying commonly-agreed
upon laws would mitigate the choice of law challenges common
to civil litigation. Moreover, labeling an activity as criminal
rather civil conveys the gravity of wrongdoing and heightens
the stigma of the activity. Last, unlike a private civil attorney,
a criminal prosecutor has significantly more tools and the
backing of a state to aid him in investigating crime and
collecting evidence. This would have a two-fold benefit. It would
ameliorate at least some of the difficulties inherent in trying to
uncover evidence that offenders can easily destroy or suppress
in the kinds of places human rights violations abound. It would
also put an attorney on more even footing with an offending
corporation. That is, whereas civil attorneys take on
multinational corporations with little more than the resources
of his or her firm, a criminal prosecutor would have the
authority and resources of his state.
In addition to the advantages highlighted above, corporate
criminal liability has several other availing qualities. Criminal
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 665,
687 (2006).
111. Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal
Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 909, 915 (2010).
112. Id. at 916.
113. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 29. Still, even without a statute of
limitations, in practice seeking a conviction for events in the distant past may
be difficult.
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proceedings carry a powerful educational message.114 They also
provide a better guarantee for victims who often are poor,
perhaps illiterate, and typically disenfranchised. 115 These are
the kind of people that may need outside help like a
government prosecutor to get justice since they do not generally
have the awareness or money to hire a civil attorney.
Furthermore, criminal corporate liability creates strong
incentives in favor of compliance. Linking corporate compliance
with sensible guidelines results in corporations that exercise
care to prevent and deter criminal conduct. They also promote
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and
lawful behavior.116 Corporate criminality improves the chances
of uncovering the guilty party (or parties). Frequently an
outside investigator, whether due to the size of the corporation
or efforts by the corporation to hide information, cannot find
the responsible person(s) whereas the corporation can. 117
Additionally, “[because] of the diffusion of responsibility in
organizations and the ways in which individual decisions are
channeled by corporate rules, policies and structures,” in rare
circumstances no individual or group of individuals may in fact
deserve blame for the crime.118 In such case, it makes sense to
blame the corporation rather than its agents for the crime.
Finally, corporate culture can cultivate the root cause of an
employee’s criminal activity.119 For example, if the corporation
provides large financial incentives for getting quick results and
has a history of turning a blind eye to criminal indiscretions,
then it arguably played a key role in encouraging illegal
activity.
iii. Criticisms of Corporate Criminal Liability
As noted above, criminal liability possesses a number of
benefits in the international corporate criminal context.
However, not everyone supports corporate criminal liability
(international or otherwise). These critics have raised a variety
114. Kremnitzer, supra note 111.
115. See id.
116. Cf. Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate
Compliance in the United States: A Brief Overview, 1731 PLI/CORP 15, 24
(2009) (listing the existence and adequacy of a pre-existing compliance
program as a possible consideration when prosecutors are determining when
to charge a corporation with criminal misconduct).
117. Moore, supra note 67, at 754.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 753.
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of objections to the practice ranging from philosophical to
practical. As discussed below, however, the force behind these
concerns is greatly diminished when considered within an
international context.
The first objection comes from philosophical-minded
detractors who argue that corporations cannot have the
required mens rea for criminal liability. While individuals have
the capacity to know right from wrong, corporations lack that
capacity and therefore cannot be criminally liable. 120 On the
other hand, proponents of holding corporations criminally liable
would argue that the corporate structure resembles that of a
human being. They have brains (the board of directors) as well
as hands and feet (agents). Therefore, when corporations have
the requisite criminal state of mind and act on it, corporations
should suffer the fruit of its illegality. In essence, if
corporations want to enjoy the benefits of legal personhood,
they should incur the same consequences as natural persons.
Other critics contend that criminal liability would actually
protect individuals within the corporation, making it harder to
achieve convictions.121 They argue that prosecutors will focus
on the big prize, the corporation rather than individuals,122 and
that, in turn, a corporation may seek to protect a guilty
employee in order to protect itself from criminal sanctions
stemming from its agent’s activities.123 However, this already
occurs within civil litigation. Civil attorneys focus on the
deepest pockets connected to their litigation. Usually that will
be the corporation. As such, at risk corporations already have
significant incentives to protect the guilty party in order to
minimize its own risks. 124 Likewise, a number of countries
already possess domestic corporate criminal liability. 125
Imposing criminal liability at the international level would not
result in increased impunity for guilty corporate officials.
120. H.J. Hirsch, La Criminalisation Du Comportement CollectifAllemagne, in LA CRIMINALISATION DU COMPORTAMENT COLLECTIF: CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS 31, 39 (H. de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds.,
Kluwer Int’l, 1996).
121. DiMento et al., Corporate Criminal Liability: A Bibliography, 28 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000−01).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. For example, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation
may be held liable for the acts of its agents 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET
AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4877 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 2009).
125. See supra Section I.B.4.b.

SUNDELL - Final

668

5/6/2011 12:12 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 20:2

Indeed, it would lead to greater accountability since states
would have greater incentive as well as political cover 126 to
investigate and prosecute corporations and their officials than
they do currently.
Another argument made by opponents of corporate
criminal liability is that the primary gain of criminal liability,
deterrence through the public condemnation and shaming of
the guilty, does not apply to corporations since people, not
corporations feel remorse. 127 Given this fact, it makes little
sense to introduce the higher burden of proof and less flexible
court proceedings that come with criminal liability. However,
public shaming affects a corporation where it cares the most:
its share price and bottom line.128 A corporation that engaged
in behavior that led to criminal sanctions and the resulting
penalties and bad press would likely find its stock value
reduced. 129 Since corporate board members are beholden to
shareholders and often receive stock options as remuneration,
they presumably have plenty of reasons to avoid criminal
activities.130
Critics also contend that imputing culpability would
routinely fail to distinguish between official and unofficial
acts.131 These critics worry about holding a corporation liable
126. That is, international law would give domestic actors a legitimate
excuse to act on the grounds that if the state does not act the international
tribunal will. In such a scenario, domestic leaders can reasonably argue that it
is better for the state to investigate and pursue legitimate claims than to
ignore the case and trust the international tribunal to handle the case.
127. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It
Serve? 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1495.
128. Unethical behavior, if discovered, hurts a business’ profitability in a
number of ways. Unethical behavior may lead to fines and lawsuits as well as
deterring consumers from patronizing the business. For instance, a 2001
survey found that seventy-six percent of Americans would boycott a company
known to have “negative corporate citizen practices.” Unethical behavior has
other less obvious negative impacts on the bottom line as well. It can be
harder to maintain and attract quality employees raising the cost of hiring
and training new and potentially less qualified replacements. A company is
also less likely to benefit from community goodwill which can translate into
lost opportunities to gain “tax advantages, recruitment opportunities and
strategic alliances.” Amie J. Devero, Corporate Values Aren’t Just Wall
MGMT.
ASS’N.,
Posters—They’re
Strategic
Tools,
AM.
http://www.thedeverogroup.com/graphics/articles/mworld%202edited_ama_%20logo.pdf.
129. Khanna, supra note 127, at 1495.
130. John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 586–87 (1982).
131. Moore, supra note 67, at 759.
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for the acts of its agents even if the corporation did not know of,
condone, or imply that the agent should commit the act. For
these critics, aggregating a corporation’s culpability would have
to include carefully considering whether upper management
knew or aided an agent’s actions as a matter of corporate
policy. Too often, these critics conclude, the acts of rogue
employees acting contrary to corporate policy or where even
careful oversight would not have detected the crime get
unjustly imputed to the parent organization. 132 This concern
seems like a weak criticism in the case of major international
violations. Major international criminal offenses like genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity generally depend on
an extensive array of activities. In such cases, wary corporate
leadership likely would know (or ought to know) about the
agent’s actions.
Another argument brought by critics of holding
corporations criminally liable is that prosecutors would abuse
their power.133 Take, for example, the United States. Although
prosecutors seldom indict corporations, critics proffer that in
cases of corporate criminal allegations prosecutors regularly
use their expansive powers to aggressively investigate the
corporation and force it to make broad concessions. In exchange
for the prosecutor deferring prosecutions, corporations
regularly waive lawyer-client privilege, 134 force removal of
senior management, 135 and stipulate to the facts as the

132. Id.
133. To demonstrate this criticism, consider Fischer Homes. In 2006 police
conducted a large raid against Fischer Homes. The police seized thousands of
pages of documents, made sure news cameras captured the entire sting
operation, and eventually indicted seven employees on various criminal
charges as well threatening Fischer Homes with a federal indictment for
money laundering (a charge designed for use against organized crime, not a
legitimate business). They gave the owner, Mr. Fischer two options. He could
plead guilty and pay a $1 million fine or he could risk a conviction. The
government also pressured the seven indicted employees to lie (i.e. to commit
perjury). The employees refused and the charges were eventually dropped
three years after the initial raid and more than a $1 million in legal fees later.
In the end, it would have cost Fischer Homes less if it had simply acquiesced
to the government’s demand to wrongfully admit its guilt. Jon Entine, A
Parable of Politicized Prosecution, WASH. POST, July 21, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/20/AR2009072002355.html?hpid=opinionsbox1.
134. Mary Jo, White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone
Wrong?, 1517 PLI/CORP. 815, 820 (2005).
135. Id. at 821–22.
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prosecutor sees them to be.136 Conversely, proponents of U.S.
corporate criminal liability counter accusations of prosecutorial
abuse by noting that corporations that have a satisfactory
compliance and ethics program are much less likely to be
prosecuted for the crimes of its employees. 137 Furthermore,
while a concern in the United States, the situation above seems
unlikely at the international level since an international
prosecutor is unlikely to wield the coercive power a federal
prosecutor has within the United States.138
In short, critics have raised a plethora of concerns over
criminal liability. These concerns possess varying levels of
persuasiveness within a domestic context. However, when
viewed through an international lens these critiques lose much
of their vitality.
B. A FORK IN THE ROAD: DOMESTIC TRIALS OR AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
Thus far this Note has contemplated the various liability
regimes the international community possesses to respond to
international corporate criminality. It now turns to the
mechanisms for carrying out those options. This section
highlights the weaknesses of domestic courts and explains why
the traditional limitations of international tribunals do not
apply in the international corporate criminality context.
A patchwork network of domestic courts adjudicating
corporate human rights offenses poses several problems. Chief
among them, few states have both the clout and the proclivity

136. Id. at 824.
137. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (protecting corporations from liability
for sexual harassment suits because they had programs in place that the
offending employee failed to utilize); see also Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (stating that corporations will not be liable for
managers’ discriminatory actions when they are contrary to the employer’s
“good faith efforts to comply with Title VII”).
138. A careful reader might wonder why this point does not cut against the
earlier argument in favor of criminal liability—i.e., that prosecutors will have
the power of the state behind him. The key lies in balance. Many private
attorneys in the developing world may not have the resources to face down a
multinational corporation. On the other hand, some U.S. government
attorneys have wielded corporate criminal liability like a bludgeon when a
scalpel would do. In the middle, an international prosecutor would have
greater resources than a developing world attorney, but less authority than a
U.S. federal prosecutor.
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to take up major corporate human rights offenses. 139 To
illustrate the issue, consider Belgium. Around the millennium
Belgian courts entertained a number of cases on the basis of a
Belgium statute granting its courts universal jurisdiction. 140
However, in the face of repeated forceful warnings from the
United States and Britain, Belgium quickly repealed its
statute.141 Moreover, even if a domestic court has jurisdiction
and renders a judgment, the court has no power to enforce its
judgment abroad. 142 An international approach to corporate
human rights abuse, on the other hand, would remedy these
concerns since any such court would likely have a provision
providing for enforcement of its judgments in the courts of
signatory states.
In contrast to domestic courts, the primary weaknesses
attached to international human rights tribunals apply with
less vigor within the context of multinational corporations. For
instance, as noted above, international courts often fail to take
sufficient account of local sentiment. For example, when South
Africa conducted widespread truth and reconciliation
commissions (TRC), having an international tribunal try key
figures would have undermined the TRCs. 143 Such meddling
would have ignored local wishes, re-opened national wounds,
and made future leaders less likely to give up power
voluntarily. But offenses by multinational corporations seem
unlikely to engender similar problems because prosecutions
would occur against a multinational entity, rather than locals.
That lack of proximity and local indictments combined with
139. See U.S. Reaction to Belgian Universal Jurisdiction Law, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 984, 986–87 (2003) (noting that Belgium repealed its law providing for
universal jurisdiction after pressure from the United States).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. This is particularly true for the courts of smaller countries because
foreign judgments have no legal effect outside that jurisdiction. Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). In order for a party to enforce the court’s
jurisdiction it must take that court’s judgment to a court with jurisdiction over
the losing party and get it formally recognized. Such recognition, however, is
not automatic. The recognizing court will look into the jurisdiction of the court
that made the judgment, the finality of the judgment, as well as the fairness of
the process and whether the foreign judgment violates its public policy. Yaad
Rotem, International Law and the Economic Crisis: The Problem of Selective
or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign
Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505, 507 (2010).
143. This is not to say that TRCs can never try local figures, in fact they
have successfully have, but rather that in some cases a local touch works
better than outsiders.
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attempts to remedy harms wrought on the local population by
outsiders would minimize the negative emotions of the harmed
community and may actually ameliorate them.
Likewise, local populations, if they notice the proceedings
at all, often view international tribunals’ brand of justice as
distinctly Western. 144 In the case of corporate offenses,
however, the target audience is not the local population, but
rather multinational corporations. An international trial in
such a situation would not go unnoticed by the relevant actors.
Nor would it generally be perceived as Occidental bias or
victor’s justice since a large percentage of multinational
corporations come from the developed world.
Finally, international tribunals may actually have less
reach than domestic fora. As products of international
cooperation and compromise, international tribunals represent
the least common denominator of human rights norms. That is,
they are typically limited to only those rights the majority of
the world could reach a consensus on.145 This limitation, if true,
however, would not pose a problem for trying corporations
engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide
because either an amended ICC or a proposed special
international tribunal would only pursue the most egregious
violations by corporations.
As opposed to its inadequacies, which apply less forcefully
in the corporate context, international tribunals’ chief
advantages remain potent. Such a tribunal’s existence would
demonstrate a broad-based resolve to clean up and deter major
corporate malfeasance. And although the actual results of such
a body probably would not live up to its mandate due to
technical and political issues, its existence and efforts would
accomplish its main objective, raising expectations of
appropriate corporate behavior. Moreover, having an
international tribunal oversee prosecutions would also mitigate
the competency and corruption problems engendered in having
developing world courts handle the case. When a local court
could not handle a case for competency or political reasons, an
international court could step in. Likewise, if a domestic court
adjudicated the matter, but the trial was a show or a sham, the
international court could again provide a backstop to prevent
144. Sterio, supra note 79, at 378.
145. See Joyner, supra note 74, at 609 (stating that international tribunals
often are influenced by the political considerations of permanent members on
the Security Council thereby undermining their effectiveness).
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injustice. Finally, an international tribunal armed with a
charter granting evidentiary powers and enforcement
obligations for signatory state courts would have a greater
chance of doing justice. In such cases, the international
tribunal would more likely uncover critical evidence and have
its judgments enforced in the relevant court than the typical
developing world court.
C. SHARING THE LOAD: THE ICC FOR MAJOR VIOLATIONS,
DOMESTIC COURTS FOR THE REST
Domestic trials and international tribunals, as discussed in
the previous section, have both strengths and weaknesses.
Recognizing these competencies and limitations, the
international community should develop a two-stream
approach which parts based on the severity of the offense. For
major offenses an international option should be on the table.
However, for lesser conduct domestic proceedings are
preferable.
Grave offenses such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide are less common and require a serious
international response. Having the option—subject to
complementarity—of conducting the trial before an
international tribunal empowered to levy criminal sanctions
makes more sense for several reasons. First, utilizing
international tribunals would provide a clear statement that
the international system has no tolerance for grave offenses.
Second, given the politics involved when one nation or entity
adjudicates the corporation of another country, an
international tribunal is superior to a domestic court. For one,
it is less likely to be swayed by the interests of powerful
corporations or government interests. It might also act as a
deterrent, encouraging states and courts to provide a
reasonably fair domestic proceeding since a sham or show trial
would not suffice to prevent an international tribunal such as
the ICC from then hearing the case.146 Finally, an international
tribunal would ameliorate jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgment issues. To bring this concern into focus, consider a
hypothetical proceeding against a security firm, Black H20, in a
146. That is, where a domestic court tries, but fails to fairly or sincerely
adjudicate the crime, an international tribunal like the ICC would provide a
backstop to re-try the case in a fair, impartial proceeding. Anne-Marie
Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 327, 341 (2006).
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Swaziland court. Assume that Black H2O committed
widespread atrocities in Swaziland but currently does not have
any offices, men, money, or equipment in Swaziland. In such a
case, Swaziland would have a hard time haling Black H20 into
court. And, even if it granted a default judgment, the plaintiff
could not recover the judgment in Swaziland because Black
H2O does not have anything of value in Swaziland. The
plaintiff would have to take the Swaziland judgment to a state
that can enforce the judgment. However, enforcement is hardly
guaranteed.147 An international tribunal with an enforcement
provision, in contrast, would avoid these issues.
On the other hand, for lesser offenses, the potential scope
of claims makes an international tribunal impractical. 148
Corporations conduct vast quantities of activities throughout
the globe. 149 They want to keep costs low while many
developing world governments want the foreign capital these
corporations provide.150 A few bad actors multiplied by millions
of corporate activities would extrapolate into an avalanche of
claims that could potentially overwhelm an international
tribunal like the ICC. Furthermore, hearing minor claims at a
centrally located international tribunal would do a disservice to
plaintiffs. Victims are often poor and uneducated. Witnesses
tend to be similarly situated in these kinds of cases. To ask
them to travel long distances for small claims would be
impractical. 151 On the other hand, permitting them to file
147. See supra text accompanying note 138.
148. See Kritz, supra note 74, at 133 (explaining that despite the mountain
of potential claims in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a
matter of practicality and policy, the ICTY and the ICTR had to limit their
prosecutions to a select few).
149. For instance, of the largest one hundred economies in the world, fiftyone are corporations. Furthermore, the leading 500 multinational corporations
conduct almost seventy percent of trade globally. World Trade Organization,
Trade Liberalisation Statistics, http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html.
150. Manuel R. Agosin and Ricardo Mayer, Foreign Investment in
Developing Countries: Does It Crowd in Domestic Investment?, UNCTAD 1
(Feb. 2000) http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_146.en.pdf (noting that
developing countries prize foreign direct investment for a variety of reasons).
151. When the author says long distance, he makes one of two
assumptions. Either the ICC would not find the claim worth setting up a court
abroad to hear or that should it set up a court abroad, that the court would
still be far from the typical third world resident. That may be because the
claimant lives in the country while the tribunal sits in a city. It might also be
because the ICC would likely not set up a tribune short of the existence of
numerous claims. In such a situation, it would make sense logistically to
locate the tribune in a centralized location, but that might also translate into
many claims being too inconvenient to pursue no matter how meritorious.
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claims in a local court improves their chances of having their
day in court. 152 Additionally, trying lesser crimes at the
international level might detract from the seriousness of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide both by
comparison and by clogging the litigation pipeline.
III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: CREATING
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR CORPORATE
ACTIVITY
For the reasons mentioned above, an international
corporate criminal liability (ICCL) scheme should be extended
to corporations. This proposition raises the question: how to
incorporate ICCL into the tapestry of international legal
mechanisms. Though a full treatment of this subject is beyond
the scope of this Note, this section will provide a brief outline of
the two most promising approaches: (1) amending the Rome
Statute to permit the ICC to hear such cases and (2) creating a
new, specialized tribunal.
A. AMENDING THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to legal persons includes
several major hurdles. The first and likely most important is
that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Given the sheer number of U.S. companies, this lacuna would
significantly weaken any attempt to establish a single,
international mechanism for handling international corporate
human rights abuses. In addition, business entities would
likely resist attempts to add legal persons under the ICC’s
umbrella. Last, ICC members, like any highly varied group,
have wide ranging views on the ICC that have already yielded
at least one failed try to include legal persons under the ICC’s
jurisdiction.153
152. Of course, this is not a perfect solution. Plaintiffs may be unable to file
a civil claim either due to lack of money, education, or desire. Big corporations
may strong-arm the process to get a desired result. But for small claims it
simply is impractical to have an international tribunal given the number of
potential claims and the international community’s likely reticence.
153. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under
International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome
Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 144–46 (Menno
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (discussing the French
government’s attempt to extend the ICC’s jurisdiction to organizations during
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While significant, these obstacles are not necessarily
insurmountable. Although the Rome Statute does not cover
corporations, this omission appears to have resulted from
procedural and definitional issues, not out of philosophical or
legal objections to the ICC applying to corporations. 154 The
disagreements during the statute’s drafting revolved around
the intricacies involved in litigating legal persons via an
international tribunal such as how to serve the indictment, who
would represent the legal person, the level of intentionality the
prosecutor must prove, and how to minimize a natural person’s
ability to hide behind group responsibility.155 Moreover, what
concern the delegates expressed about corporate criminal
liability tended to focus on quasi-public corporate entities and
non-governmental associations such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization rather than the ramifications for private
corporations.156 In addition to relatively mild opposition at the
ICC’s drafting to include corporations under its jurisdiction,
states have increasingly adopted the ICC and implemented its
definitions. Indeed, a number of countries have gone so far as
to permit charging corporations with international crimes. 157
Similarly, many states have adopted domestic corporate
criminal liability schemes.158 These trends combined with the
importance of resolving major international abuses by
corporations suggest the potential (albeit a small one) for
collective action.
Assuming the international community manages to
navigate these considerable political challenges, changes to the
ICC’s underlying treaty language would need to occur. As
currently written, Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court states that “the Court shall have
jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”159 It
does not discuss legal persons. However, adding the three
words “and legal persons” to Article 25(1) would bring
the negotiation stage of the Rome Statute).
154. Id. at 191.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. For an in-depth survey of legal remedies in sixteen countries from a
cross section of regions and legal systems, see Anita Ramasastry & Robert C.
Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector
Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law--Executive Summary (2006),
available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf.
158. See supra Section I.B.4.b.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
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corporations within the ICC’s ambit.160
Along with amending Article 25(1) to include legal persons,
the drafters would also have to include several other new
provisions. For example, what actions could a court impute to
the corporation? This Note proposes imposing corporate
liability for an employee’s illegal acts (1) related to and
committed within the course of employment, (2) committed in
furtherance of the business of the corporation, and (3)
authorized or acquiesced in by the corporation.
Likewise, the ICC would have to establish a sentencing
framework for determining the culpability of the corporation.
At its most straightforward, the ICC could impose strict
liability on the presumption that the corporation must have
known of any offense grave enough to result in ICC
adjudication. However, this Note proposes a more nuanced
approach that considers three aggravating factors and two
mitigating factors. Under this Note’s tentative suggestion the
ICC would look at: (1) the involvement in or tolerance of
criminal activity by “high level” or “substantial authority”
personnel, (2) a recent history of similar misconduct on the
organization’s part, and (3) whether the corporation tried to
obstruct justice. Mitigating factors might include (1) the
presence of an effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law by corporate agents and (2) the extent of the
corporation’s cooperation with law enforcement officials.
In addition, the ICC would need to re-evaluate its
penalties. Currently, the ICC has two choices: imprisonment
and fines.161 Imprisonment may work if a corporate leader faces
individual charges, but it does little to punish the actual
corporation. Moreover, ICC reparations, while a promising
penalty, would need reconsideration in light of corporations’
significantly greater resources. For example, a $2 million dollar
judgment might harm an individual, but a multibillion dollar
enterprise would barely notice. Consequently, penalties for
legal persons should include the option of significantly stiffer
monetary fines.

160. For example, it could read: the Court shall have jurisdiction over
natural and legal persons pursuant to this Statute.
161. Rome Statute, supra note 46, art. 77.
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B. A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
LIABILITY
If the signatories of the ICC cannot cooperate to amend the
ICC, states could instead fashion a special tribunal. Past
success at creating limited tribunals to adjudicate criminal
prosecutions, 162 human rights violations, 163 and international
business complaints164 suggests this as a potential solution. In
order to develop a new tribunal for international human rights
abuses by corporations, a coalition of states would need to write
a charter document imposing the obligations and duties of
multinational corporations. This Note suggests limiting the
obligations to major offenses like war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide as well as perhaps gross
environmental damage. The document would then need to
establish what constitutes a breach of each of those obligations
and duties and lay down penalties for breaches. Penalties could
include fines, depriving the corporation of the gains it received
as a result of its illegal activities, suspending the corporation’s
operations for a period of time, placing the corporation on
probation, ordering the corporation to reorganize, or dissolving
the corporation altogether. Following the creation of the
substantive elements of the special tribunal, members would
have to establish a procedural framework. Suggesting
procedures goes beyond the conceit of this Note, but in
determining the tribunal’s procedural aspects, drafters should
draw from experiences with the multiplicity of special tribunals
in other areas of international law. Finally, the charter would
have to include enforcement mechanisms that would require
the domestic courts of signatories to recognize and enforce the
international court’s rulings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Corporations conduct business on every continent in
virtually every way. They own satellites that photograph the
planet below as well and bounce cell phone and Internet signals
162. See
GEERT-JAN
ALEXANDER
KNOOPS,
SURRENDERING
TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES 1 (2002) (discussing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).
163. For example, the European Court of Human Rights and InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
164. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs (GATT) and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
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throughout the globe. They provide military resources via
research and development, equipment, and manpower. They
rummage throughout the planet acquiring oil, lumber, and a
host of other natural resources. Most of these activities usually
do not result in violations of human dignity, but where they do
corporations should not escape liability simply because they are
a legal person rather than a natural person or a nation-state.
Just as corporate activity comes in many shapes and sizes
so too should the response to corporate abuses. For lesser
offenses, States should handle the aftermath through their
legal systems. In such situations, States are best positioned to
weigh the costs and benefits of assessing corporate criminal
responsibility. Moreover, practicality dictates this approach
since the international community has little stomach to
develop, empower, and pay for a legal system sufficiently large
to handle the array of claims that might result from hearing
cases arising from nearly two hundred nations.
In contrast, for larger offenses, particularly war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, the international
community should take a more active role. Large offenses call
for a clear response from the world that the action is
unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Given the necessity for
an unambiguous response, the inadequacies of domestic legal
systems and the advantages of an international tribunal, an
international tribunal should oversee such adjudications.
The form of law applied should also be tailored to the type
of offense. For lesser offenses, civil liability should be the
general rule. Smaller offenses are less deserving of the
heightened opprobrium attached to criminal sanctions.
Similarly, because the offenses are smaller and therefore less
noteworthy, a government sympathetic to foreign investment
may be inclined to ignore the matter. Civil liability enables a
victim to pursue their claim independent of the government’s
inclination. Furthermore, civil liability tends to impose a less
strenuous burden of proof that aids victims in their quest for
being made whole.
On the other hand, for grave offenses an international
tribunal should apply criminal law. In contrast to lesser
offenses, major offenses such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide are sobering accusations that require
significant sanctions where appropriate. Criminal law best
accomplishes these objectives by unambiguously expressing the
gravity of the offense, demonstrating the international
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community’s resolve, and ensuring maximum due process
protection for the accused. In this way—permitting domestic
courts to continue handling smaller human rights offenses
while permitting, subject to complementarity, the trial of major
corporate human rights offenses in an international tribunal—
the international system can accommodate recalcitrant states
that do not support the ICC and other international
adjudicatory bodies while better serving victims of gross
corporate human rights abuse.

